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Abstract—Anomaly detection is referred to as a process
in which the aim is to detect data points that follow
a different pattern from the majority of data points.
Anomaly detection methods suffer from several well-
known challenges that hinder their performance such
as high dimensionality. Autoencoders are unsupervised
neural networks that have been used for the purpose
of reducing dimensionality and also detecting network
anomalies in large datasets. The performance of autoen-
coders debilitates when the training set contains noise and
anomalies. In this paper, a new gradient-reversal method
is proposed to overcome the influence of anomalies on
the training phase for the purpose of detecting network
anomalies. The method is different from other approaches
as it does not require an anomaly-free training set and is
based on reconstruction error. Once latent variables are
extracted from the network, Local Outlier Factor is used
to separate normal data points from anomalies. A simple
pruning approach and data augmentation is also added
to further improve performance. The experimental results
show that the proposed model can outperform other well-
know approaches.
Keywords— network anomaly detection, high di-
mensionality, autoencoders (AEs), Local Outlier Factor
(LOF), Gradient Reversal
I. INTRODUCTION
In many real-world problems such as detecting fraud-
ulent activities or detecting failure in aircraft engines,
there is a pressing need to identify observations that
have a striking dissimilarity compared to the majority.
In medicine for instance, this discovery can lead to
early detection of lung cancer or breast cancer. One area
that is growing really fast is computer networks that
plays a pivotal role in our daily life. Protecting networks
from various threats such as network intruders is crucial.
By using machine learning algorithms, it is possible to
monitor and analyse the network and detect these threats
almost instantly. However, when the number of observa-
tions that the method aims to detect is very small with
respect to the whole data, these methods start to struggle,
i.e., their performance debilitates. These observations are
called anomalies (also known as outliers). The process
whereby the aim is to detect data instances that deviate
from the pattern of the majority of data instances is
referred to as anomaly detection [?]. Depending on the
application domain, anomalies can occur due to various
causes such as human error, system failure, or fraudulent
activities.
Traditional anomaly detection methods, e.g., density-
based or distance-based, are found to be less effec-
tive and efficient when dealing with large-scale, high-
dimensional and time-series datasets [1][2][3]. Moreover,
most of these approaches in the literature often require
large storage space for the intermediate generated data
[4].
Moreover, parameter tuning for classical approaches
such as clustering models in large-scale datasets is a
difficult task [5]. Consequently, the dimensionality of
such datasets should be reduced before applying anomaly
detection methods. This is achieved by performing a
pre-processing step known as dimensionality reduction,
which tries to remove irrelevant data while keeping
important variables and transforming the dataset into a
lower dimension. Besides high dimensionality, lack of
labelled datasets is another problem in this context. Many
supervised learning algorithms have been employed to
detect anomalies; however, an essential requirement of
a supervised learning approach is labelled data. While
availability of labelled datasets is often a problem, la-
belling can also be costly, time-consuming, and requires
a field expert [6]. Lastly, in many application domains,
such as telecommunication fraud and computer network
intrusion, companies are often very conservative and
protective of their data due to privacy issues and tend
to resist providing their data [4].
In this paper, the aim is to tackle the mentioned
problems by employing an unsupervised approach in
which high-dimensional data is compressed into lower
dimensionality, and a density-based method is then ap-
plied to the transformed data in order to detect network
anomalies. In particular, a deep autoencoder (AE) net-
work is used to create low-dimensional representations,
and next, Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [7] is utilised
for separating normal data instances from anomalies.
Although autoencoders have shown promising results,
their performance weakens when the dataset contains
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noise and anomalies [8]. To overcome this issue, var-
ious approaches have been proposed such as denoising
autoencoders or using a loss function which is insensitive
to anomalies and noise [9].
The main contributions of this paper, as will be
elaborated in subsequent sections, are the following:
• First, unlike other similar approaches that require a
noise and anomaly-free training set, the proposed
model in this paper is insensitive to anomalies;
therefore, our approach is needless of anomaly-free
training sets.
• Second, the proposed method is robust to large
datasets, and is particularly good with high-
dimensional network datasets.
• Third, the method is capable of working with unla-
belled datasets.
The proposed model is tested on 8 different datasets
including 5 well-known network datasets. Evaluation of
experimental results show that the proposed model can
improve the performance significantly and is superior
to the stand-alone LOF and two other state-of-the-art
approaches. The rest of this paper is organised as follows.
Section II reviews previous works, while section III
explains the proposed model. Experimental results are
presented and discussed in section IV, and subsequently
the paper concludes with section V.
II. RELATED STUDIES
There are various methods for anomaly detection
and several studies have categorised them into dif-
ferent groups. For instance, in [10], authors cate-
gorised them into the following four groups: distribution-
based, distance-based, clustering-based, and density-
based methods. Arguably, the most widely accepted
categorisation is based on the type of supervision used,
i.e., unsupervised, semi-supervised and supervised [1].
Except for unsupervised methods, labelled data is re-
quired for training models that are semi-supervised or
supervised, and as explained earlier, labelling data brings
various challenges; therefore, unsupervised models are
more favourable [6].
Traditional anomaly detection methods try to search
the entire dataset and detect anomalies which will result
in discovering global anomalies. However, in many real-
world problems the data is incomplete and often the
application requires a local neighbourhood search for
identifying anomalies [11]. One of the approaches that
aims at measuring the outlierness of each data instance
based on the density of its local neighbourhood is LOF.
However, traditional methods such as LOF fail to achieve
an acceptable result when applied to large and high-
dimensional datasets, and moreover they tend to require
large storage capacity in this context [3][2].
To overcome the aforementioned problems, several ap-
proaches have been proposed in which high-dimensional
data is transformed into a low-dimensional space while
trying to avoid loss of crucial information. Next, anomaly
detection is carried out on the low-dimensional data.
Recently, autoencoders have been widely employed
for the purpose of reducing dimensionality of large
datasets. An autoencoder refers to an unsupervised neural
network that tries to reconstruct its input at the output
layer [12]. It is made of two main parts, namely an
encoder and a decoder. The encoder tries to convert the
input features into a different space with lower dimension
while the decoder attempts to reconstruct the original
feature space using the output of the decoder, which is
known as the bottleneck or discriminative layer. In terms
of network structure, autoencoders come in various types
such as under-complete, over-complete, shallow or deep.
A comprehensive review can be found in [13]. Because
of its ability to encode data without losing information
it has been widely employed in the literature. Unlike
other dimensionality reduction methods such as Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) that use linear combina-
tions, AEs generally perform nonlinear dimensionality
reduction and, according to the literature, perform better
than PCAs [14]. Authors in [15] used AE for anomaly
detection and compared its performance to linear PCA
and kernel PCA on both synthetic and real data, and
based on the result, they concluded that AE can extract
more subtle anomalies than PCA. Another disadvantage
of statistical algorithms such as PCA or Zero Component
Analysis (ZCA) is that as the dimensionality increases,
more memory is required to calculate the covariance
matrix [16].
A well-trained autoencoder should generate small re-
construction errors for each data point; however, autoen-
coders fail at replicating anomalies because their patterns
deviate from the pattern that the majority of data in-
stances follow. In other words, the Reconstruction Error
(RE) of anomalies is greatly above the RE of normal
data. In some studies such as [17], the authors used
a threshold-based classification using the reconstruction
error as a score to separate normal data from anomalies,
i.e., the data instances that have a reconstruction error
above the threshold are identified as anomalies while
anything below the threshold is considered as normal. In
another similar approach, the authors in [18] generated
an anomaly score based on reconstruction error and in-
dividual attribute probabilities in large-scale accounting
data.
The authors in [19] proposed an approach in which
ensembles of AEs were used to improve the robustness of
the network. In their approach, named Randomised Neu-
ral Network for anomaly Detection (RandNet), instead
of using fully connected layers, the connections between
layers are randomly altered, and anomalies are separated
from normal data using the reconstruction error. Their
approach showed superior performance compared to four
traditional anomaly detection methods including LOF.
To enhance the performance of AEs, authors in [4]
added new regularisers to the loss function that en-
courage the normal data to create a dense cluster at
the bottleneck layer while the anomalies tend to stay
outside of the cluster. Next, they employed various
Once Class Classification (OCC) methods such as LOF,
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE), and One Class SVM
(OCSVM) to divide the data into anomalies and normal
data. They also investigated the influence of altering the
training set size on the performance of their models and
the result showed consistency across different training
sizes.
As the number of hidden layers increases, the back-
propagated gradients to the lower layers tend to attenu-
ate, which is known as the vanishing gradient problem,
and culminating in the weights of lower layers showing
limited change. To overcome the vanishing gradient
issue and discover better features, a pretraining phase
was proposed in [16] in which a stacked Restricted
Boltzmann Machine (RBM) was used to obtain suitable
weights for initialising the AE. The authors applied
their model to the NSL-KDD dataset and achieved high
accuracy (83.34%).
The performance of AEs diminishes when datasets
contain anomalies and/or noise which is very prevalent
in real-world datasets. By using Denoising AEs (DAEs),
it is possible to enhance the accuracy of the network.
DAE is an extension of AE in which the network is
trained on an anomaly and noise-free set while random
noise is added to the input and the AE tries to regenerate
the original input, i.e., without the added noise. Authors
in [15] used a DAE to obtain meaningful features and
decrease the dimensionality of data. Their result proved
that DAE is superior to statistical methods such as PCA.
DAEs require an anomaly and noise-free training set;
however, such a training set is not always available. In
related work, [9], the authors proposed an AE, called
Robust Deep Autoencoder (RDA), that can extract satis-
factory features without having access to an anomaly or
noise-free training set. Inspired by Robust PCA (RPCA),
they added a penalty-based filter layer to the network that
uses either L1 or L2,1 norms, and managed to separate
anomalies and noise from normal data.
A common criterion used in AEs is Mean Square
Error (MSE). As mentioned before, anomalies and noise
tend to cause greater reconstruction error, i.e., larger
MSE; consequently, the network carries out a substantial
weight update. Therefore, it debilitates the accuracy of
AEs as they tend to learn to regenerate anomalies and
noise. A possible remedy to this problem is using a
criterion which is insensitive to anomalies and noise.
Authors in [8] proposed a new approach, called Robust
Stacked AutoEncoder (R-SAE), in which they used the
maximum correntropy criterion to prevent substantial
weight updates and make the model robust to anomalies
and noise. They tested their model on the MNIST dataset
contaminated with non-Gaussian noise, and achieved
39%-63% lower REs compared to what was obtained
from a Standard Stacked AutoEncoder (S-SAE).
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In the previous section, different approaches for
extracting meaningful features from high-dimensional
datasets were reviewed and also previous anomaly de-
tection models were explained. In this section, we
will explain how our model robustly transforms high-
dimensional data into a low-dimensional space and de-
tects anomalies.
A. Local Outlier Factor
LOF is a density-based anomaly detection method in
which the assumption is that anomalies tend to stay out-
side of dense neighbourhoods because of their peculiar
characteristics that distance them from inliers [20]. The
method generates a score that shows the outlierness of
each data point based on its local density. A low score
indicates that the query point is an inlier while a high
score shows that the query point is an anomaly. The
algorithm has one parameter, MinPts, which is the
minimum number of neighbours that each data point is
expected to have inside its neighbourhood.
It is possible to divide the anomaly detection process
of LOF into three steps. In the first step, LOF tries to
find the minimum distance, called k-distance, to hold at
least MinPts neighbours. Next, the algorithm measures
the reachability distance defined as:
reach-distk(p, o) = max{k-distance(o), d(p, o)} (1)
which is equal to k-distance of point o if the query
point is also inside point o’s neighbourhood, otherwise
it is equal to the actual distance between the two points.
In the second step, the local reachability distance (LRD),
which is the inverse of the average reachability distance
of the data point p from its neighbours, is measured.
LRD is defined as:
LRDMinPts(p)=1/
( ∑
o∈NMinPts(p)
reach-distMinPts(p,o)
|NMinPts(p)|
)
(2)
in which MinPts denotes the number neighbours in data
point p’s neighbourhood that is used to detect anomalies.
In the final step, the LRD of the query point is compared
with the LRD of its neighbours using the following
equation:
LOFMinPts(p) =
∑
o∈NMinPts(p)
lrdMinPts(o)
lrdMinPts(p)
|NMinPts(p)| (3)
If the density of point p is very close to its neighbours,
then the value of LOF stays around 1 while for inliers
it is less than 1 and for anomalies it is greater than 1. It
is worth mentioning that it is very common to apply
a simple threshold-based clustering here to separate
anomalies.
B. AutoEncoders
Autoencoders are unsupervised artificial neural net-
works that contain two components [12]. The first
component, known as the encoder, tries to transform
the high-dimensional input data into a low-dimensional
feature space, known as the bottleneck, while the second
component, known as the decoder, attempts to recon-
struct the input data from the bottleneck. The difference
between the reconstructed and input data is called the re-
construction error. In each training iteration, the network
measures the reconstruction error, computes the gradient
of the error with respect to network parameters (e.g.
weights), and backpropagates these gradients through
the network in order to update the weights to minimise
the reconstruction error, i.e., to increase the resemblance
between the generated output and the input. AEs can
adopt various structures. In Figure 1, the structure of an
AE, known as Stacked Autoencoder (SAE), is shown in
which multiple layers are stacked to form a deep neural
network.
As shown in Figure 2, the most basic AE with only
one hidden layer tries to transform input x into latent
vector z using an encoder represented by function u.
Next, the latent vector u is reconstructed by a decoder
represented as function v into output y where the dis-
similarity between y and x is called reconstruction error.
Having a training set, Du = {x1, x2, x3, ..., xn}, where
n is the number of data points in D and xi is the ith
data point with m features, the encoder is then defined
as:
Encoder DecoderBottleneck
Fig. 1: The structure of a deep undercomplete autoen-
coder
z = u(x) = s(Wx+ b) (4)
while the decoder is defined as:
y = v(z) = s′(W ′z + b′) (5)
where both s and s′ represent the activation functions
that are most often non-linear, W and W ′ denote the
weight matrices while b and b′ represent the bias vectors.
x z y
u v
Fig. 2: The structure of a basic autoencoder
It is worth mentioning that, in general, certain restric-
tions or regularisation techniques should be applied to
an AE in order to prevent the network from learning
the identity function. Otherwise, the network will simply
copy the input through the network. A common solution
to overcome this issue is by using a denoising AE. In
a DAE, the network tries to reconstruct inputs that are
partially corrupted. Bottlenecks and sparsity constraints
applied to the main hidden layer are additional ways to
avoid trivially learning the identity function.
C. AEGR: The Proposed Model for anomaly Detection
in Large Datasets
The proposed AEGR (autoencoder with gradient re-
versal) approach consists of two main components. The
first component is an AE which transforms the high
dimensional data into compressed data while preserving
important latent variables for the following component.
The second component employs a basic LOF approach
on the features obtained from the first component to
separate anomalies from normal data points.
Algorithm 1: AEGR
input : D: a dataset with n×m dimension
e← number of epochs
output: D′: a dataset with n×m′ dimension
1 initialise: k ← GR start point;
2 LGS = list of gradient scores;
3 for each epoch do
4 for each point/mini-batch in epochj do
5 if j > k then
6 for each layer do
7 if bottleneck then
8 GSj ← ||n||F
9 LGS ← GSj
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 MaxGS ← Max GS in LGS ;
15 Bacpropagate inverted MaxGS ;
16 Shuffle the batches;
17 end
18 D′ ← the bottleneck of the last epoch
According to the literature [8], the performance of
AEs diminishes when the data exhibits noise and anoma-
lies. To explain further, the network tries to reduce the
reconstruction error by learning how to reconstruct noise
and anomalies. During the training phase, anomalies
tend to produce a greater reconstruction error as their
patterns deviate from the distribution that the majority of
data points follow. The network thus disproportionately
backpropagates the corresponding error gradients and
performs a substantial weight update to be able to
reproduce these patterns with lower error. However, in
the context of anomaly detection, this is not desired. In
fact, in previous works, various approaches have tried
to prevent the network from becoming more accurate in
reproducing anomalies. Most of these approaches such as
DEA require access to a noise and anomaly-free set for
training the network while our model is needless of such
a training set. Authors in [21] tried to add a reversal layer
to their network for the purpose of domain adaption. The
approach proposed in this work is different in several
ways including the context within which it is applied,
and the fact that unlike the approach in [21], it is based
on the reconstruction error.
In AE with gradient reversal (AEGR), the AE compo-
nent tries to make the network insensitive to anomalies
by manipulating gradients. First, as shown in Algorithm
1, at each epoch a gradient score (GS) is given to each
data point (or each mini-batch in the case of using mini-
batch gradient descent) based on the gradients in the
bottleneck. This is measured by using the Frobenius
norm which is defined as:
||X||F =
√√√√√ k∑
i=1
l∑
j=1
|xi,j |2 (6)
where X denotes a k × j matrix and xij represents the
element at the ith row and jth column. At the bottleneck
layer, the Frobenius norm of each node is computed. The
bottleneck is the layer that latent variables are extracted
from to be used in LOF; therefore, the network should
be penalised based on the magnitude of its gradients in
this layer rather than every layer. Then, the norm of layer
l is measured and stored as:
{l1, l2, l3, ..., ln} (7)
where n denotes the number of data points (or mini-
batches in case of using mini-batch gradient descent)
in the network. The approach has a single parameter,
k, which is the epoch number when the network starts
reversing its gradients.
Assuming that anomalies produce greater REs, at each
epoch, the gradient of the data point that holds the
largest GS is picked, and the inverse of its gradient is
used to perform a new weight update, i.e., reverting the
substantial weight update caused by this data point. In
order to avoid reverting the gradients of the same data
points at each epoch, batches are shuffled before carrying
out the next epoch.
In the second stage in which LOF is used to separate
anomalies from normal data points, three different ap-
proaches are proposed. The first approach merely uses
the latent variables that are extracted from the previous
stage without any alternation while in the second ap-
proach, a threshold-based clustering method based on
the reconstruction error of the training set is applied to
prune data points that have generated an error above
the mean value. The assumption behind this approach
is that the training set becomes more homogeneous and
consequently LOF can perform more robustly. However,
this approach also reduces the number of training points
that can weaken the performance of one-class classifiers
[22]. Therefore, a third approach is proposed in which
the pruned training data is augmented by adding random
Gaussian noise. The assumption is that data augmenta-
tion can homogeneously increase the size of the training
set and improve anomaly detection performance.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, the performance of our model is pre-
sented, evaluated and compared with 1) the basic stand-
alone LOF algorithm; 2) a deep AE whose reconstruction
error is used for separating anomalies; and 3) a deep
AE whose latent variables are fed to LOF for detecting
anomalies. One of the widely used evaluation metrics
in this area is Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
AUC; however, authors in [23] claim that when the data
set is highly imbalanced, ROC AUC is not a suitable
metric and a better alternative would be the area un-
der the Precision-Recall curve (PR) AUC, in particular,
when working with high dimensional data in which the
positive class, i.e, anomalies, is more important than the
negative class, i.e., normal points. Nonetheless, no single
evaluation metric dominates others; therefore, both ROC
AUC and PR AUC were used for evaluation.
A. Datasets
As presented in Table I, 8 datasets were used that are
publicly available and widely used in this context. It is
worth mentioning that 5 network datasets that are very
common in the domain of network anomaly detection
were used besides 3 non-network datasets. Testing the
model on various datasets makes it possible to evaluate
performance more thoroughly. It is worth noting that
the categorical features of two datasets, namely NSL-
KDD and UNSW-NB15, were preprocessed by applying
a one-hot-encoder. Four datasets, namely Spambase,
InternetAds, Arrhythmia and CTU13, have no separate
training and test sets; therefore, 60% of each dataset
was used for training while the rest was evenly split for
validation and testing. For the remaining five datasets
that come with a separated training and test set, 20%
of the training set was used for validation. Also, as
suggested in [24], the training sets of UNSW-NB15 and
NSL-KDD are substantially larger than other datasets;
therefore, only 10% of the training set was used. In this
paper, it was found necessary to apply the same size
reduction approach to the CTU13 and Shuttle dataset.
The details of each dataset are shown in Table I.
The following datasets were obtained from the UCI
Machine Learning Repository: PenDigits, Shuttle, Spam-
base, and InternetAds [25]. The CTU13-08 dataset was
released in 2011, which is a botnet dataset and publicly
available [26]. The NSL-KDD dataset is a new version of
its predecessor, KDD’99, in which some of the intrinsic
issues of its old version, mentioned in [27], are resolved.
This dataset has 41 features in which 3 of them are cate-
gorical and after applying a one-hot-encoder, the number
of features increased to 122. A similar preprocessing
step was carried out on the UNSW-NB15 dataset [28]
with 3 categorical features, which increased the number
of features from 42 to 190. While 5 datasets contain
TABLE I: Details of the 8 datasets used in the experi-
ments
Data set name No. offeatures
Training
set
Validation
set
Testing
set
PenDigits 16 1247 312 727
Shuttle 9 3267 817 14500
Arrhythmia 259 251 83 86
Spambase 57 2759 919 923
InternetAds 1558 1414 471 474
NSL-KDD(Probe) 122 6319 1580 12132
NSL-KDD(DoS) 122 9060 2266 17169
NSL-KDD(R2L) 122 6183 1546 12598
NSL-KDD(U2R) 122 5428 1358 9778
UNSW-NB15(Fuzzers) 196 5934 1484 74184
UNSW-NB15(Analysis) 196 4640 1160 58000
UNSW-NB15(Backdoor) 196 4619 1155 57746
UNSW-NB15(DoS) 196 5460 1366 68264
UNSW-NB15(Exploits) 196 7151 1788 89393
UNSW-NB15(Generic) 196 7680 1920 96000
UNSW-NB15(Reconnaissance) 196 5319 1330 66491
UNSW-NB15(Shellcode) 196 4570 1143 57133
UNSW-NB15(Worm) 196 4584 1146 56130
CTU13-13(Virut) 40 4315 1438 1440
CTU13-10(Rbot) 38 7331 2443 2445
CTU13-09(Neris) 41 12895 4298 4301
CTU13-08(Murlo) 40 8045 2681 2683
only a single type of anomaly, three network datasets,
namely UNSW-NB15, NSL-KDD and CTU13, include
different types of anomalies (i.e., network attacks). The
experiment was carried out on each type of these attacks.
B. AEGR Architecture and Parameters
The AE architecture varies slightly based on the
dataset it is applied on; however, the same architecture
was used for both AE and AEGR. The number of layers
was set to 5 for all the datasets as suggested in [29]
with the number of nodes in the bottleneck being set to
m = [1+
√
n], where n is the number of features of the
input [30]. Table II shows the number of nodes in the
bottleneck for each dataset.
For datasets with more than 2000 instances, the mini-
batch size was set to 64 and 16 otherwise. To avoid
overfitting, a simple early stopping heuristic was im-
plemented to stop the training process when the net-
work was no longer learning after a certain number
of iterations or when the learning improvement was
insignificant.
The loss function used in this experiment was
Smoothl1Loss, which is essentially a combination of
L2 and L1 terms, i.e., it uses L2 if the absolute element-
wise error is less than 1 and L1 term if not. To minimise
the loss function, Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
was used.
All the datasets where normalised into the range
[−1,+1], and the hyperbolic tangent activation function
TABLE II: The size of the middle layer for each dataset
Dataset’s name Number of nodes inthe bottleneck
PenDigits 5
Shuttle 4
Spambase 8
InternetAds 40
Arrhythmia 17
NSLKDD 12
UNSW-NB15 15
CTU13 7
was used for all the layers except the last layer. The
activation function is defined as:
ftanh(x) =
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
(8)
where the output range is (−1,+1).
C. LOF Parameters
The LOF algorithm has only one parameter, i.e., k,
that needs to be set. This value indicates what is the
minimum number of neighbours that each data instance
requires to have when computing its density. Throughout
our experiment this k was set to a constant value.
D. Analysis and Discussion
The performance of AEGR-LOF was compared with
three different approaches. Besides employing the tra-
ditional LOF, an autoencoder with LOF (AE-LOF) and
an autoencoder with RE (AE-RE) were used. In AE-
LOF, the network is not using gradient reversal and its
bottleneck is fed to the next stage for separating normal
instances from anomalies. In AE-RE, the reconstruction
error of the AE is used for detecting anomalies. It is
worth mentioning that a denoising AE was not used in
the experiment as it needs an anomaly-free training set
and the purpose of this research is to stay needless of a
clean training set. Also, it is possible to achieve higher
performance by employing LOF if only a clean training
set is used in advance to fit LOF first and use it as a
one-class classifier [24], which has already been done
in the literature; however, in this work, LOF is trained
based on the data which is extracted from the AE.
As mentioned earlier, the evaluation metrics used here
are PR AUC and ROC AUC. The ROC AUC shows
the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve
(ROC) which presents the true positive rate versus the
false negative rate at various thresholds. The range of
AUC is [0, 1] where any value closer to 1 shows that
the model is performing better. In PR AUC, the true
negatives have no impact on the metric. Instead, it reports
the relationship between precision and recall at various
thresholds. Similar to ROC AUC, the range is [0, 1] in
which values closer to 1 indicate a better performance.
It can be seen in Table III that the proposed model
almost outperformed other approaches in every scenario
(i.e., different types of network attack) in terms of
both metrics. Stand alone LOF only showed superior
results when applied to detect DoS attacks while also
showed good results alongside other approaches when
used to identify Worms. The UNSWB-NB15 dataset is
a high dimensional dataset and the results can be used
to support the assumption that LOF performs poorly
when applied to this type of dataset. The NSL-KDD and
CTU13 are two network datasets that are widely used in
the literature. As shown in Table IV, the proposed model
outperformed other approaches by a good margin except
in one case, i.e., when applied to CTU13-08.
Table V shows the performance when applied to
datasets with a single type of anomaly. Based on the
results, the proposed approach outperformed other mod-
els except when working on the Shuttle dataset. In par-
ticular, AEGR-LOF produced higher PR AUC and ROC
AUC when detecting anomalies from the two single-type
network datasets, i.e., Spambase and InternetAds.
Figure 3 illustrates the latent variables produced by
the simple AE and the AEGR model. While Figure
3a and Figure 3c show the latent variables extracted
from the bottleneck of the simple AE, Figure 3b and
Figure 3d present the latent variables generated by the
proposed model. By looking at Figure 3a and Figure
3b, which show the latent variables before pruning,
it can be seen that while the simple AE managed to
regenerate some anomalies correctly and separate them
from the normal data points, the AEGR model failed at
separating anomalies due to the constraint applied, i.e.,
they stayed close to the dense area. However, this failure
means that the AEGR model should have generated high
reconstruction errors for anomalies. After applying a
simple pruning based on the reconstruction error (Figure
3c and Figure 3d), the latent variables created by the
AEGR model made a denser cluster compared to the
simple AE, which led to getting a better performance
from LOF as it can define a better class boundary when
the training set is very dense and homogeneous.
Overall, AEGR-LOF with pruning or pruning and data
augmentation achieved 17 best results from 22 compar-
isons. Therefore, it can be concluded that AEGR-LOF is
significantly better than other approaches, which shows
the importance of regularisation in AEs when used in
anomaly detection problems. To support this conclusion
further, Wilcoxon signed-rank test [31] was carried out
to verify whether the improvement was significant or not.
TABLE III: The PR AUC and ROC AUC values for UNSW-NB15
Detection approach Modificationmethod
Fuzzers Analysis DoS Exploits Generic Reconnaissance Shellcode Worms
PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC
Stand-alone LOF None 0.793 0.562 0.983 0.702 0.926 0.778 0.667 0.603 0.583 0.499 0.872 0.590 0.986 0.618 1.000 0.846
AE-RE None 0.722 0.329 0.97 0.593 0.853 0.584 0.605 0.443 0.687 0.624 0.873 0.572 0.981 0.589 0.998 0.091
AE-LOF
None 0.786 0.520 0.986 0.720 0.862 0.589 0.633 0.506 0.563 0.463 0.869 0.557 0.987 0.627 1.000 0.877
Pruning 0.791 0.568 0.983 0.721 0.863 0.569 0.654 0.537 0.574 0.518 0.850 0.475 0.980 0.517 1.000 0.881
Pruning+DA 0.646 0.205 0.940 0.381 0.815 0.422 0.569 0.374 0.377 0.012 0.858 0.538 0.996 0.850 1.000 0.750
AEGR-LOF
None 0.785 0.532 0.998 0.948 0.858 0.601 0.620 0.499 0.597 0.518 0.858 0.538 0.988 0.632 1.000 0.861
Pruning 0.810 0.574 0.998 0.955 0.848 0.543 0.601 0.475 0.674 0.626 0.841 0.467 0.979 0.485 1.000 0.902
Pruning+DA 0.833 0.576 0.986 0.698 0.876 0.697 0.742 0.655 0.879 0.758 0.945 0.772 0.991 0.726 0.999 0.342
TABLE IV: PR AUC and ROC AUC for NSL-KDD and CTU13
Detection approach Modificationmethod
DoS Probe R2L U2R VirutCTU13-13
Rbot
CTU13-10
Neris
CTU13-09
Murlo
CTU13-08
PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC
Stand-alone LOF None 0.549 0.555 0.830 0.635 0.810 0.687 0.994 0.530 0.644 0.781 0.845 0.465 0.708 0.060 0.940 0.594
AE-RE None 0.547 0.440 0.800 0.056 0.790 0.543 0.994 0.569 0.431 0.463 0.815 0.057 0.864 0.003 0.920 0.001
AE-LOF
None 0.522 0.492 0.821 0.645 0.756 0.525 0.994 0.551 0.439 0.558 0.807 0.254 0.747 0.199 0.933 0.564
Pruning 0.549 0.512 0.895 0.742 0.757 0.409 0.994 0.516 0.371 0.412 0.799 0.241 0.981 0.880 0.988 0.908
Pruning+DA 0.687 0.781 0.683 0.296 0.766 0.548 0.993 0.451 0.518 0.639 0.895 0.523 0.966 0.900 0.800 0.068
AEGR-LOF
None 0.514 0.488 0.844 0.677 0.823 0.679 0.997 0.789 0.552 0.699 0.857 0.514 0.719 0.088 0.928 0.577
Pruning 0.925 0.883 0.947 0.841 0.859 0.685 0.998 0.817 0.472 0.588 0.899 0.547 0.891 0.452 0.979 0.782
Pruning+DA 0.643 0.695 0.797 0.598 0.674 0.287 0.993 0.550 0.797 0.832 0.859 0.597 0.992 0.985 0.917 0.332
TABLE V: PR AUC and ROC AUC for data sets with single-type anomaly
Detection approach Modificationmethod
Spambase InternetAds PenDigits Shuttle Arrhythmia
PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC PR ROC
Stand-alone LOF None 0.596 0.418 0.857 0.498 0.554 0.529 0.700 0.343 0.638 0.626
AE-RE None 0.606 0.324 0.838 0.188 0.483 0.368 0.792 0.007 0.558 0.289
AE-LOF
None 0.579 0.428 0.853 0.515 0.574 0.590 0.819 0.689 0.681 0.678
Pruning 0.650 0.497 0.909 0.638 0.980 0.970 0.839 0.720 0.703 0.688
Pruning+DA 0.503 0.334 0.859 0.538 0.315 0.078 0.635 0.105 0.605 0.616
AEGR-LOF
None 0.551 0.377 0.854 0.521 0.491 0.499 0.689 0.398 0.698 0.671
Pruning 0.558 0.388 0.928 0.687 0.998 0.998 0.696 0.414 0.728 0.732
Pruning+DA 0.682 0.646 0.854 0.538 0.970 0.958 0.812 0.559 0.512 0.484
(a) AE (b) AEGR (c) AE (Pruned) (d) AEGR (Pruned)
Fig. 3: Visualisation plot of the latent variables (the first two features) extracted by a simple AE and also AEGR on
InternetAds. The orange points represent anomalies while the blue points represent the normal points. The curves
at the top and right side of each figure indicates the KDE curves.
Therefore, the NSL-KDD(DoS) dataset was randomly
selected and the test was carried out on both LOF
and AEGR-LOF with pruning and data augmentation
20 times, i.e., N = 20. By feeding PR AUCs to the
Wilcoxon test, it was confirmed that the results are
significantly different. It is worth recalling that carrying
out repeated Wilcoxon tests on multiple algorithms is
not recommended as it increases the chance of rejecting
a certain proportion of the null hypotheses merely based
on random chance [32].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new model is proposed to detect
network anomalies, particularly in large datasets, that
traditional algorithms such as LOF are incapable of deal-
ing with. In the proposed approach, a novel autoencoder
called AEGR is utilised to reduce the dimensionality
of large datasets, transforming the data into a lower
dimensional space while minimising the loss of vital
features. Normal AEs fail to produce satisfactory results
when the data is polluted with noise and anomalies
because the network learns to replicate them together
with normal data instances. Unlike other approaches that
either try to use an insensitive loss function or train
the network by injecting noise, the unsupervised model
presented in this work, at each epoch, finds the data
instances that caused the highest weight update, and
then manipulates the inverted backpropagated gradients
to counter that update. Finally, we apply the original
LOF to the extracted features from the bottleneck of
the autoencoder in order to separate normal instances
from anomalies. Based on the results that were achieved
from the experiments conducted on seven datasets, it
was shown that the AEGR-LOF model is capable of
achieving better results compared to the traditional LOF
and other similar approaches such as a simple Au-
toencoder followed by a threshold-based classifier. The
performance of the proposed model was evaluated using
two metrics in which overall the AEGR model showed
superior results.
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